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Australasian Association of Philosophy

 2 0 2 4   A  A  P   C O N F E R E N C E  O N L I N E ,  16 - 18 October 2024

PANEL

Commentary and Responses on

Gila Sher’s ‘The “Post-Truth” Crisis, the Value of Truth, and the Substantivist-Deflationist Debate’

Australasian Philosophical Review (APR) Special Volume

This panel of commentators will discuss the profound impact the post-truth era has upon philosophers who explore the nature and value of truth. Panelists will be composed of commentators and curators of the volume.

Research Interests:

Foundations of Logic, Knowledge, and Truth, Human Values, Science, Mathematics, Meta-Ethics, Kant, Tarski, Quine

Selected Topics:

• Principle of Logicality, Logical Realism, Logical Structuralism, Logical Exceptionalism (anti-exceptionalism), Logic and the Formal Structure of the World, Invariance under Isomorphisms (Maximal Invariance), Scope of Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics of Logic, Logical Consequence, Logical Constants, Tarski, Branching Quantification,
  Mathematics: Realism without either Platonism or Empiricism, Mathematical Properties vs. Mathematical Individuals, Invariance in Mathematics, Relation between Logic and Mathematics
• Epistemic Friction and Freedom, Foundational Holism (Foundations without Foundationalism, World-Oriented Holism, 3-Dimensional Holism), Dual Grounding of Knowledge in the World and the Human Mind, Neo-/Post-Quinean Model of Knowledge, Ubiquitous Role of Intellect in Knowledge, Intellect as Figuring out, Joint Sensory-Intellectual Access to the World, Basic Realism, Philosophy as a Branch of Knowledge, Kant, Quine, Scientific Change, Pessimistic Meta-Induction, Scientific Laws and Invariance, Abstraction in Science, Realism and Pragmatism.
• Truth as a Human Value (a Value-Theoretic Approach to Truth), The Post-Truth Crisis, Enlightened Correspondence, Correspondence Pluralism, Truth in Science, Logic, Mathematics, and Ethics, Fundamental Principle of Truth (Immanence, [Human] Transcendence, Normativity), Substantivist Approach to Truth, Critique of Deflationism, The Liar Paradox, Kant, Tarski and Kripke on Truth
• Origins, Content, and Features of Human Values, The Human Value of Truth, Mackie’s Objection to the Reality of Values

Selected Publications

Books

• Logical Consequence (Cambridge, 2022) [Amazon] [Cambridge] [Review]
• The Foundational Problem of Logic. Book-form translation of article. (China Social Sciences Press, 2018)
• Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic (Oxford, 2016) [Amazon] [Oxford] [Back Cover] [Contents] [Preface][First Page]
• Between Logic and Intuition: Essays in Honor of Charles Parsons. Co-editor, with R. Tieszen. (Cambridge, 2000) [Cambridge] [Amazon]
• The Bounds of Logic: A Generalized Viewpoint. (MIT, 1991)

Journal Special Issue

• Between First- and Second-Order Logic. Co-editor: with Otávio Bueno. Synthese 196, 2019

Articles

• The Post-Truth Crisis, The Value of Truth, and the Substantivist-Deflationist Debate. Lead article. Special Issue of Australasian Philosophical Review, with commentaries  and responses.
• "Logical Structuralism". The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic. E. Brendel, M. Carrara, F. Ferrari, O. Hjortland, G. Sagi, G. Sher, F. Steinberger. Oxford. Forthcoming.
• "Foundational Holism". Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. 3rd edition. Ed. K.L. Sylvan. Forthcoming.
• “Logical Realism: A Tale of Two Theories”. The Philosophy of Penelope Maddy. S. Arbeiter and J. Kennedy. Springer. 2024.
• "Correspondence Pluralism". Synthese 168 (2023): 169 (24 pp.).
• "Is Logic Exceptional?". Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture (2023): 23-41. (Taiwan.)
• "Human Thought, Mathematics, and Physical Discovery". Mathematical Knowledge, Objects and Applications: Essays in Memory of Mark Steiner. C. Posy and Y. Ben-Menachem. Springer. 2023. 301-25.
• “A New Defense of Tarski’s Solution to the Liar Paradox”. Philosophical Studies 180 (2023): 1441-66.
• The Metaphysics of Truth: Anti-Deflationism and Substantial Pluralism.Inquiry 66 (2023): 1494-512.
• Human Thought, Mathematics, and Physical Discovery.Mathematical Knowledge, Objects  and Applications: Essays in Memory of Mark Steiner. C. Posy and Y. Ben-Menachem. Springer. 2023. 301-25.
• Invariance as a Basis for Necessity and Laws.Philosopical Studies 178 (2021): 3945-74.
• Invariance and Logicality in Perspective.The Semantic Conception of Logic: Essays on Consequence, Invariance, and Meaning. G. Sagi & J. Woods. Cambridge 2021. Pp. 13-34.
• Quine vs. Quine: Abstract Knowledge and Ontology. Quine, Structure, and Ontology. F. Janssen-Lauret. Oxford 2020. Pp. 230-52.
• Where are You Going Philosophy, and what are Your Methods?. Academics271 (2020): 185-96.
• Pluralism and Normativity in Truth and Logic,American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2020): 337-50.
• Invariance and Necessity. Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Proceedings of the 41^st International Wittgenstein Symposium. Eds. G.M. Mras, P. Weingartner, and B. Ritter. De Gruyter. 2019. Pp. 55-70.
• Where Are You Going, Metaphysics, and How are You Getting There? - Grounding Theory as a Case Study.Quo Vadis, Metaphysics? M. Szatkowski. De Gruyter Studium 2019. Pp. 37-57.
• "Foundational Holism, Substantive Theory of Truth, and a New Philosophy of Logic: Interview with Gila Sher by Chen Bo". Philosophical Forum 50 (2019): 3-57.
• On the Explanatory Power of Truth in Logic.Philosophical Issues (Noûs) 28 (2018):348-73.
• Truth & Scientific Change.Journal of General Philosophy of Science 48 (2017): 371-94.
• Lessons on Truth From Kant. Analytic Philosophy58 (2017): 171-201.
• Truth & Transcendence: Turning the Tables on the Liar Paradox. Reflections on the Liar. B. Armour-Garb. Oxford 2017. Pp. 281-306.
• Substantivism About Truth.Philosophy Compass. 11 (2016): 818-28.
• The Model-Theoretic Argument: From Skepticism to a New Understanding. The Brain in a Vat. S. Goldberg. Cambridge. 2016. Pp. 208-25.
• Wallace, Free Choice, and Fatalism. Freedom & the Self: Essays in the Philosophy of David Foster Wallace. S.M. Cahn & M. Eckert. Columbia. 2015. Pp. 31-56.
• Truth as Composite Correspondence. Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. H. Galinon, D. Achourioti, K. Fujimoto, J. Martinez. Springer. 2015.Pp. 191-210.
• The Foundational Problem of Logic. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.19 (2013): 145-98.
• Forms of Correspondence: The Intricate Route from Thought to Reality.Truth & Pluralism: Current Debates.  N.J.L.L. Pedersen & C.D. Wright. Oxford. 2013. Pp. 157-79.
• Introduction & Commentary on Jennifer Hornsby's Truth: 'The Identity Theory'The Aristotelian Society. The Virtual Issue. April 2013.
• Truth & Knowledge in Logic & Mathematics. The Logica Yearbook 2011. M. Pelis & V. Puncochar. London: College Publications, King's College, 2012. Pp. 289-304.
• Logical Quantifiers. Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language. D. Graff Fara & G. Russell. Routledge. 2012. Pp. 579-95.
• Is Logic in the Mind or in the World?. Synthese181 (2011): 353-65.
• Epistemic Friction: Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Erkenntnis 72 (2010): 151-76.
• Book Review:Jody Azzouni. Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth.  2006. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 50 (2009): 97-117.
• Tarski's Thesis. Alfred Tarski: Philosophical Background, Development, and Influence. D.E. Patterson. Oxford. 2008. Pp. 300-39.
• Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts. With C.D. Wright. Truth & Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language.  G. Siegwart and D. Greimann. Routledge. 2007. Pp. 280-306.
• Functional Pluralism. Philosophical Books 46 (2005): 311-30.
• In Search of a Substantive Theory of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy 101 (2004): 5-36.
• A Characterization of Logical Constants Is Possible. Theoria18 (2003): 189-97.
• Logical Consequence: An Epistemic Outlook. The Monist 85 (2002): 555-79.
• Truth, the Liar, and Tarski's Semantics. A Companion to Philosophical Logic. D. Jacqette. Blackwell. 2002. Pp. 145-63.
• The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence.The Philosophical Review 110 (2001): 241-61.
• Truth, Logical Structure, and Compositionality. Synthese 126 (2001): 195-219.
• The Logical Roots of Indeterminacy. Between Logic and Intuition. Eds. G. Sher & R. Tieszen. Cambridge. 2000. Pp. 100-23.
• Is There a Place for Philosophy in Quine's Theory?The Journal of Philosophy 96 (1999): 491-524.
• Is Logic a Theory of the Obvious?. European Review of Philosophy4 (1999): 207-38.
• What Is Tarski's Theory of Truth?Topoi 18 (1999): 149-66.
• On the Possibility of a Substantive Theory of Truth. Synthese117 (1998/99): 133-72.
• Partially-Ordered (Branching) Generalized Quantifiers: A General Definition. The Journal of Philosophical Logic26 (1997): 1-43.
• Did Tarski Commit 'Tarski's Fallacy'? The Journal of Symbolic Logic61 (1996): 653-86.
• Semantics and Logic. The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory, ed. S. Lappin. Blackwell. 1996. Pp. 509-35.
• Ways of Branching Quantifiers. Linguistics and Philosophy13 (1990): 393-422.
• A Conception of Tarskian Logic. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly70 (1989): 341-68.

Interviews & Remembrance

Philosophical Interviews: 

• "Foundational Holism, Substantive Theory of Truth, and a New Philosophy of Logic: Interview with Gila Sher by Chen Bo".  Philosophical Forum 50 (2019): 3-57.
• "The Place of Philosophy". Interviewer: Richard Marshall, 3AM Magazine. 

Charles Parsons – Remembrance

CURRICULUM VITAE: Link